FRANCHISING-COURT RESTRICTS RIGHT OF FRANCHISOR TO

TERMI-

NATE FRANCHISE-A PRELUDE TO THE FRANCHISE PRACTICES ACT?-

Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (L.
Div. 1972).
In 1959, Frank Marinello was solicited by a representative of Shell
Oil Company to become its dealer at an existing Shell station in Fort
Lee, New Jersey. He accepted Shell's offer and executed the standard
lease and dealer contracts. This relationship between the parties continued on a year-to-year basis until May, 1969, when Shell and Marinello
entered into a new three year contract which provided for termination
on May 31, 1972. On February 2, 1972, Marinello met with Shell's
representatives at the company's district office whereupon he was informed that his lease would not be renewed. Two months later Shell
sent formal notice to Marinello and demanded that he surrender the
premises on the termination date. However, on June 1, Marinello refused to quit the premises despite his contractual obligation to sur-

render possession peaceably.
Shell brought suit in the county district court for possession of
the premises,' and, in response, Marinello commenced an action in the
superior court seeking injunctive relief against his eviction by Shell.
By order of the assignment judge the two actions were consolidated in
superior court for trial. In Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,2 the court granted

extraordinary relief by implying the existence of a covenant that the
franchisor would not terminate the franchise as long as there was "substantial performance" by the franchisee and thus greatly restricted
Shell's right to terminate the franchise relationship." The court, prevented from expressly applying the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act,4
based its decision in part on the underlying spirit of the Act, thus for
the first time providing some insight into the expected application and
effect of the legislation on the franchise relationship in New Jersey.5
Judge Gelman noted four distinct issues:
1 Shell's suit was brought pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (1952).
2 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (L. Div. 1972).
8 Id. at 376, 294 A.2d at 263.
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972-73).
5 Judge Gelman noted that
legislative judgments may be and frequently are highly persuasive in pointing out
to the courts the direction in which they ought to go in the individual case ....
The Franchise Practices Act . . . strongly suggests that the relationships
projected by such agreements, whether in existence prior to or created after its
effective date, require special attention and should be the subject of close judicial
scrutiny and supervision.
120 N.J. Super. at 375, 294 A.2d at 263.
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(a) Was the Franchise Practices Act applicable to lease and dealer
agreements?
(b) Was the franchisor's statutory and contractual right to possession of the premises absolute, or was it subject to limitation due to the
special relationship evidenced by the course of dealings?
(c) If Shell's right to possession was not absolute, did Marinello
substantially perform his contractual obligations?
(d) Was Shell prevented from seeking relief by virtue of the un6
clean hands doctrine?
The court resolved the first issue by concluding that the Franchise
Practices Act, which prohibits a franchisor from terminating or failing
to renew a franchise "without good cause," was not applicable to Marinello's relationship with Shell. 8 This provision embodies the primary
intent of the Act, which is to prevent an unjust cancellation by the
"dominant" franchisor. The lease and dealer agreements executed by
Shell and Marinello clearly constituted a relationship which was subject
to the Act, but the legislation controlled only those franchise agreements entered into after the effective date of the statute, December 21,
1971.9 Since the Act was clearly prospective in its effect, and Marinello
entered into his franchise agreement prior to the effective date of the
Act, the court was prevented from expressly subjecting Shell's failure
to renew Marinello's lease to the "good cause" test set out in the Act.10
6

Id. at 368, 294 A22d at 259.

§ 56:10-5 (Supp. 1972-73), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be a violation of this act for a franchisor to terminate, cancel or fail to
renew a franchise without good cause. For the purposes of this act, good cause
for terminating, canceling, or failing to renew a franchise shall be limited to
failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those requirements imposed
upon him by the franchise.
8 120 N.J. Super. at 370-71, 294 A.2d at 260.
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-8 (Supp. 1972-73) provides:
This act shall not apply to a franchise granted prior to the effective date of
this act, provided, however, that a renewal of a franchise or an amendment to an
existing franchise shall not be excluded from the application of this act.
10 120 N.J. Super. at 369-71, 294 A.2d at 259-60. The court found that the history of
the act unequivocally evidenced the intention of the Governor and the legislature to make
the Act's application prospective. Governor Cahill vetoed the Act in its original form
because he believed that it was retroactive and therefore unconstitutional. He advised the
legislature thusly:
If such were the case, it would have the effect of impairing the obligation of
existing contracts. This is prohibited by both the United States and New Jersey
Constitution. It is my recommendation that this language be amended so that
the act shall not apply to any existing franchises.
Id. at 370, 294 A.2d at 260. The Governor's recommendation was incorporated into the
act as finally passed. Id.
7 N.J. STAT. ANN.
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In spite of the fact that Marinello was not able to invoke the aid
of the Franchise Practices Act, the spirit of the Act was effected through
the court's use of a variety of equitable remedies. Addressing itself to
the issue of whether Shell could unilaterally terminate the agreements
and take possession of the leased premises at the end of the stipulated
term, the court, despite authority which supported Shell's "absolute
right" to exercise unilateral termination of the franchise, 1 went beyond
the four corners of the franchise agreement. Judge Gelman examined
the history of the relationship between the parties, their "true intent
and purpose and the reasonable expectations of the parties."' 1 The court
noted that it was not dealing with the usual landlord-tenant relationship, but rather a form of commercial venture for the distribution of
plaintiff's products in which both parties had a stake in promotion. In
light of these considerations the court questioned whether Shell could
sever its ties with the defendant without good cause. 13
Judge Gelman concluded that the franchisor could not do so and
Marinello was given the extraordinary remedy of reformation, as the
court implied the covenant that Shell would renew so long as the defendant "substantially performed his obligations" to his franchisor. 14
The court justified its action by relying on the philosophy articulated
in Marini v. Ireland15 and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.16
11 See, e.g., Parks v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 386 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1967); Shain
v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1962); All States Serv. Station, Inc. V.
Standard Oil Co., 120 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See also Gellhor, Limitations on Contract
Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465, 468, where the author

noted that a court's reformation of a termination clause was the exception rather than
the rule, because freedom of contract usually prevailed over a defense of breach of good
faith.
12 120 N.J. Super. at 371-72, 294 A.2d at 261.
18 Id. at 372, 294 A.2d at 261.
14 Id. at 376, 294 A.2d at 263.

Courts ordinarily will not afford the remedy of reformation except in certain welldefined situations. In Heake v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 15 N.J. 475, 105 A.2d 526 (1954), the
court concluded that
relief will be granted only where there is mutual mistake or where a mistake on
the part of one party is accompanied by fraud or other unconscionable conduct
of the other party.
Id. at 481, 105 A.2d at 529. Furthermore, in Agee v. Travelers Indem. Co., 264 F. Supp.
322 (W.D. Okla. 1967), the court held:
To justify reformation of a written instrument the proof should be clear, unequivocal and decisive. There must be more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence and the evidence must be sufficient to take the question out of the range
of reasonable controversy.
Id. at 326.
15 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (court allowed equitable defenses in a dispossess
action and further held that a tenant may deduct cost of repairs from future rent if
landlord fails to repair vital facilities necessary to maintain premises in a livable condition).
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While neither of these cases involved a franchise relationship, they
stand for the proposition that a court can reform a contract to the
17
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.
Henningsen is sound precedent because many of the aspects of an
adhesion contract involved in that case, which prompted that court to
grant reformation, were also present in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello: lack
of free bargaining in light of the economic imbalance between franchisor and franchisee, use of the standard form agreement imposed by
the franchisor and injury to the public interest by the literal enforcement of the contract.' 8 Likewise, Marini provided a solid basis for a
court to reform a contract when a literal construction would have circumvented public policy. 19 Implicit in both Henningsen and Marini
is the recent willingness of courts to scrutinize contracts entered into by
parties of vastly different economic strengths. 20 Judge Gelman's response
in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello reflected this growing propensity, and
eventually caused him to reform the contract to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the parties. He found these expectations to be such
that if Marinello "substantially performed his obligations to Shell," considering his investment in money, time and effort, Shell "would in
turn continue to renew his lease and dealership."' 21 The court buttressed
its action by noting the relative bargaining positions of the two parties,
observing that Marinello was "compelled to rely upon Shell's good faith
' 22
in living up to these expectations.
In this connection Judge Gelman permeated his opinion with
criticism of Shell's marketing system and that of the oil industry as a
whole. 23 While courts have traditionally avoided remedial action which
16 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (court refused to give effect to a disclaimer clause
in an automobile sales contract and implied a warranty of merchantability).
17 See Note, Sales: Privity: Disclaimer Clauses in Standardized Warranties,46 CORNELL
L.Q. 607, 607-08 (1961); Note, Remedies-Tenant's Right to Rent Deduction for Repair
Expenditures, 2 SETON HALL L. Rxv. 267, 271-72 (1970).
1s 120 N.J. Super. at 375-76, 294 A.2d at 263. See generally Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
19 120 N.J. Super. at 375-76, 294 A.2d at 263.
20 See Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchisesand the Code-Mixing Classified and
Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. LAw. 1075, 1079 (1967); Comment, Contracts
of Adhesion under California Law, 1 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. RPv. 306, 307-10 (1967).
21 120 N.J. Super. at 373-74, 294 A.2d at 262.
22 Id. at 374, 294 A.2d at 262.
23 Id. at 372-73, 294 A.2d at 261-62. Judge Gelman relied extensively on the reasoning
in Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967),
where the court went well beyond the literal contract and examined the franchise relationship.
The relationship of a major oil company to "ts service station dealer goes
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required the reformation of termination clauses in franchise contracts, 24
there is authority suggesting that some courts will reform a cancellation
clause when its enforcement would be inequitable. 25 Courts granting
beyond the bigness-littleness antithesis that exists in innumerable contract negotiations and in the operations of a modem, large business. The inherent leverage
a major oil company has over its dealers results from the market structure of the
industry and the special dependence on the company of the service station
dealer ....While it is true that it is expensive for Shell to switch dealers, it is far
more expensive, in relative terms, for a dealer to lose his station.
Id. at 487 (footnote omitted).
24 See note 11 supra. Also, in A.B.C. Packard, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.2d
63 (9th Cir. 1960), the court allowed termination without damages pursuant to a cancellation clause in a franchise agreement. The court observed:
There is no question but that one party was .. . an economic giant, the other,
relatively, an economic pigmy. Such economic inequality may well be a tangible
force of tremendous power in shaping the terms of the contract eventually
signed . . . . But once the contract is signed, such economic inequality per se,
does not create a legal fiduciary relationship between the contracting parties,
absent (a) those terms within the contract sufficient to create that relationship;
or (b) those facts outside the contract which, per se, create "fraud" sufficient to
require the creation of a duty to disclose no matter what technical relationship
may be created by the terms of the contract.
Id. at 67 (footnote omitted). See also Phoenix Hardware Co. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish
Corp., 122 N.J. Eq. 140, 192 A. 45 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937) (court held that mutual covenants
in distributorship arrangement need not be co-extensive); Brower v. Glen Wild Lake Co.,
86 N.J. Super. 341, 206 A.2d 899 (App. Div. 1965) (court held that when lease gave lessees
right to renew for a ten-year period with renewal to be in all respects on same terms and
conditions set forth in the lease, lessees were not entitled to renewal including renewal
clause for additional ten-year period so as to make original lease subject to perpetual
renewals).
25 See J.R. Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 84-85, 235 N.W. 845, 846 (1931), where
the court held:
A provision in a contract for termination at the option of a party is valid. But
where the relationship is commercial and does not involve fancy, taste, sensibility,
judgment, or other personal features, the option may be exercised only in good
faith.
Furthermore, in Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire Stores, 161 S.C. 487, 492,
159 S.E. 825, 827 (1931), the court stated that the defendant, who objected to termination
of his contract, was entitled
to show by the evidence.., that it would be against equity and good conscience
to permit plaintiff . . . to terminate the jobber's agreement in the manner, and
with the intent and purpose alleged against it ....
In deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971), a federal court
of appeals broadened the rule established in PhiladelphiaStorage Battery by holding that
provisions in a franchise agreement authorizing either party to terminate the agreement
without cause upon stipulated notice did not provide a complete defense to a dealer's
action for wrongful termination even in the absence of fraud or duress, where termination
would constitute an actionable wrong if the manner of termination was contrary to
equity and good conscience. Id. at 1100.
Also, in Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 353-54, 437 P.2d 892, 894
(1968) (footnote omitted), the court observed:
[Franchise contracts] are almost always drawn up by the franchiser and are
presented to a dealer ...

for acceptance ... rather than for negotiation as to terms.

They also invariably provide for ample protection to the rights of the franchiser,
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the remedy of reformation have based their actions on such theories as
unjust enrichment, estoppel, waiver and economic duress.2
In Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello the court, while considering all of
these defenses, relied primarily on the theory of economic duress. This
approach was based on the highly unequal bargaining positions of the
respective parties which causes the franchisee to be at the mercy of the
franchisor during negotiations. 27 In deciding to reform the contract,
the court was doubtlessly influenced by the fact that over a 13-year
period Marinello had transformed a sub-par station that was pumping
less than 38,000 gallons per month into one which dispensed more than
78,000 gallons. 28 The court further intimated that Shell could be equitably estopped from enforcing its contractual right to cancel because
agents had represented to Marinello that if he made the requisite in.
' 29
vestment of labor and skill "he would have a 'future' with Shell.
After meticulously taking similar principles from factually varying
cases and piecing them together to provide authority, Judge Gelman
reached out for further support by relying on the spirit of the Franchise
Practices Act which he had found inapplicable to the franchise agreement under consideration. 0 The court felt compelled to take cognizance of the fact that "the public interest has been legislatively declared to be vitally affected." 8'
including the right of termination.... [W]hen parties enter into a contract of this
character, and there is no express provision that it may be cancelled without cause,
it seems fair and reasonable to assume that both parties entered into the arrangement in good faith, intending that if the service is performed in a satisfactory
manner it will not be cancelled arbitrarily.
26 See Gellhorn, supra note 11, at 485-93, where the author discussed the various
equitable remedies used to combat unconscionable enforcement of a cancellation clause.
27 120 N.J. Super. at 373-74, 294 A.2d at 262.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942), Justice Frankfurter
noted:
"It always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two
evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude
duress."
Id.

at 326-27 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting from Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv.

Comm'n, 248 US. 67, 70 (1918)). See also Comment, Dealer Franchising in the Gasoline
Industry: Current Developments, 4 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REv. 65 (1969), where it was noted
that "[t]he F.T.C. found that the marketing system of the petroleum companies has
reduced the retail dealer's position from an independent businessman to an economic
serf." Id. at 65 (footnote omitted).
28 120 N.J. Super. at 373, 294 A.2d at 262.
29 Id.
50 See note 10 supra.

81 120 N.J. Super. at 375, 294 A.2d at 263. Contra, Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d
618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 (1940), where the court ignored a statute which
provided for the suspension or revocation of the license of an automobile manufacturer
who wrongfully and without provocation terminates a franchise, holding that the statute
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In contrast to Judge Gelman's decision is the recent case 2 involving Marinello's brother which was based on similar facts but brought
in the New Jersey federal district court. Judge Coolahan, in granting
Shell's motion for summary judgment on a count of its counterclaim,
specifically rejected a plea for reformation of the termination clause
because there was no evidence of fraud or mistake in the execution of
the instrument in controversy. 8 The court further maintained that
unequal bargaining power at the time the lease was negotiated was not
a basis for granting reformation.8 4 Ignoring Henningsen and Marini
which Judge Gelman had so heavily relied upon, the court found no
New Jersey authority for such judicial action. 5 Lastly, the federal court
did not take into consideration an expressed legislative intent or public
policy evidenced by the Franchise Practices Act.
After implying the existence of a covenant that Shell could not
cancel without good cause, Judge Gelman had to determine whether
such good cause existed to justify Shell's refusal to renew the lease. Once
again he turned to the Franchise Practices Act for an interpretation of
good cause, and applied the test of whether Marinello had "substantially performed" his contractual obligations. 6
Shell's major allegation was that Marinello violated the cleanliness
clause of the lease. After hearing extensive testimony the court rejected
Shell's evidence as not being credible. 8 This dismissal was due in part
could "not apply to, or affect, existing valid contracts." Id. at 621 (emphasis added). But see
Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court, on rehearing, held that a franchise statute was indicative of public
policy against unfair cancellations and thus could be the basis of an injunction. Id. at 503a,
71 N.W.2d at 428.
82 Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., Civil No. 1506-72 (D.N.J., filed Dec. 13, 1972). [The
brothers spell their surname differently.]
38 Id. slip opinion at 6.
84 Id. slip opinion at 6-7.
85 Id. slip opinion at 8-9.
36 120 N.J. Super. at 378-79, 294 A.2d at 264-65. See note 7 supra.
See generally Gellhorn, supra note 11, at 495-521, where the author discussed various
tests to insure fairness in franchise termination.
87 120 N.J. Super. at 381, 294 A.2d at 266. Article 7 of the 1969 lease provided:
Lessee shall at all times maintain the premises . . . in good condition and
repair, and keep the same, as well as Lessee's own property thereon, neat, clean
and orderly.
Id. at 366, 294 A.2d at 258.
In Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 US. 1002 (1967),
the court discussed Shell's organizational structure which led to overly extensive control of
its franchisees, and noted that such control resulted, in part, from the "devise of house-
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to the vagueness of the Shell representatives' work sheets, which usually failed to detail objections. However, the real attack on Shell's
credibility surfaced in another part of the opinion, where the court
scrutinized the plaintiff's marketing system. The court observed that
the representatives had sales quotas for Shell's tires, batteries and accessories (TBA). It was established that a representative's TBA sales
record played at least some part in the promotion procedure for the
representative and his immediate superior, the sales supervisor for the
district.8 8 Unfortunately for Marinello, while running a very productive
service station, his purchases of TBA were well below that of the average dealer.8 9 Consequently, after examining Shell's marketing system,
the court could not view the testimony of the Shell representatives
concerning Marinello's performance as reliable, because
[t]he very individuals who initiate the life-or-death decision for
Shell dealers are also the same individuals who are most directly
and immediately concerned with the sale of Shell TBA to its
40
dealers.
Since the court was convinced that a built-in bias in the corporate records existed against Marinello, it is not surprising that Shell's evidence
was given little weight. Judge Gelman held that Shell had no just cause
to terminate the franchise because Marinello had substantially per41
formed his obligations under the lease and dealer agreements.
Although this finding was dispositive, the court, however, went on
to additionally consider the applicability of the clean hands doctrine.
Marinello's defense of unclean hands rested on two specific aspects of
Shell's marketing practices: it was alleged that Shell unlawfully discriminated against Marinello in the pricing of gasoline sold to him,
and that Shell illegally refused to renew his lease because of his failure
42
to purchase a sufficient amount of Shell TBA.

The court first found that Marinello's allegation of price discrimination was supported by sufficient evidence. 43 As a result, Shell had
violated both state and federal legislation which prohibited such prackeeping requirements concerning the station's use, maintenance and appearance which,
if breached, could result in immediate cancellation of a lease without notice." Id. at 481.
88 120 N.J. Super. at 387, 294 A.2d at 269.
39 Id. at 386, 294 A.2d at 268-69. Marinello did not have an express obligation to
purchase TBA, but the court found it to be implicit in Shell's relationship with all its
dealers. Id. at 382-83, 294 A.2d at 267.
40 Id. at 388, 294 A.2d at 269.
41 Id. at 382, 385, 294 A.2d at 265, 268.
42 Id. at 385, 294 A.2d at 268.
43 Id. at 390, 294 A.2d at 270.
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tices.44 Judge Gelman also found Shell's marketing of its TBA to be
fraught with antitrust violations. 45 The court maintained that Shell's
organizational structure for marketing its products was inherently coercive-the result of tying the sale of gasoline to its franchisees to their
purchase of Shell TBA. Judge Gelman compared this to the marketing
system condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Atlantic
Refining Co. v. FTC,46 where Atlantic agreed to promote Goodyear
TBA and the FTC successfully enjoined the use of coercion exerted by
Atlantic on its dealers in the promotion of the plan. The Court held
that this arrangement was in restraint of trade. 47 Judge Gelman concluded that Shell's marketing system was even more anti-competitive
than the one in Atlantic Refining because Shell was actually selling its
own branded TBA to its dealers. 4s Since Shell's conduct toward Marinello was violative of these statutory prohibitions, the court concluded
that his defense of unclean hands also barred plaintiff's dispossess
49
action.
However, Judge Gelman's application of the unclean hands doctrine should be scrutinized. There is no hard and fast rule controlling
when the defense should be available because courts have given the
doctrine a flexible construction. 50 Generally, the defense is viable when
44 The Unfair Motor Fuels Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-22(a), (c) (1964),
prohibits distributors such as Shell from granting gas price rebates or allowances or
discriminating, either directly or indirectly, in their tank wagon gas prices between
retail dealers "except to meet competition." The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970),
prohibits discrimination in rebates, discounts and underselling in particular localities.
45 120 N.J. Super. at 387-88, 294 A.2d at 269. It is unlawful for a franchisor to enter
into an agreement tying in the sale of gasoline to the sale of TBA when it results in
restraint of trade. See the Unfair Motor Fuels Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-22(b)
(1964) and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
46 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
47 Id. at 371.
48 120 N.J. Super. at 388, 294 A.2d at 269.
For support of Judge Gelman's conclusion see Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d
43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), where the court held that an illegal
tie-in occurred when the trademark license to sell the franchisor's product included the
condition that the franchisee purchase other equipment exclusively from the franchisor.
However, in Chicken Delight there was an express requirement obligating the franchisee
to purchase the franchisor's accessory products while in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello the
court found an implied tie-in agreement resulting from Shell's coercive marketing system.
120 N.J. Super. at 387, 294 A.2d at 269. Concerning proof requirements involved with
implied tie-in agreements, see Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 390-92 (S.D.
Fla. 1972).
Regarding antitrust legislation and the franchise relationship see Helm, The Present
Posture of Franchising,19 DEPAuL L. REv. 102 (1969); Comment, supra note 27.
49 120 N.J. Super. at 392-93, 294 A.2d at 272.
50 See Untermann v. Untermann, 19 N.J. 507, 517-18, 117 A.2d 599, 604-05 (1955),
where the court discussed the general application of the doctrine.
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the party soliciting judicial relief is guilty of unconscionable conduct
which is related to the remedy sought. 51 Even if Shell were found tc
have violated various statutes, it would not necessarily support an un52
clean hands defense to a dispossess action. In the Mariniello opinion
of the New Jersey federal district court it was held that the appropriate remedy for these violations was not continued possession of the
premises, but rather the penalties prescribed by the allegedly violated
statutes. 58 Judge Coolahan relied on Helfenbein v. International Industries, Inc.,54 where the court concluded that when a lease contract
between parties is clear and unequivocal any default thereunder could
subject the sublessees to a summary eviction. 55 There existed no equitable ground or authority for a federal court to intervene by enjoining
the action despite alleged antitrust violations. 56 However, even the
court in Helfenbein indicated that it would have considered an equitable defense had there been evidence that the eviction proceeding was
based upon the sublessees' refusal to continue to buy according to any
57
tie-in agreement.
This was precisely the finding by Judge Gelman in Shell Oil Co.
v. Marinello, as he observed that plaintiff
elected to expand its marketing activities to include the sale of TBA
to its dealers, and it has created an organizational structure to carry
out that objective which is inherently coercive and which inevitably tends to tie in the sale of its gasoline to its dealers to their
purchase of Shell TBA.58
51 See City of Paterson v. Schneider, 31 N.J. Super. 598, 607, 107 A.2d 553, 558 (App.
Div. 1954), where the court noted that the alleged conduct
must . . . be related to the act of the plaintiff which is the subject matter of the
cause of action, and it must be an evil practice or wrongful conduct in the
particular transaction in respect to which the plaintiff seeks redress.
52 Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., Civil No. 1506-72 (D.N.J., filed Dec. 13, 1972).
53 Id. slip opinion at 5.
54 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971).
55 Id. at 1071.
58 Id.
57 Id. The court in Helfenbein found "no evidence that the eviction proceeding [was]
based upon plaintiffs' refusal to continue to buy according to any tie-in agreement." Id.
Judge Coolahan also cited Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959), as support for his
decision that violations of federal and state antitrust statutes would not support a defense
of unclean hands to a dispossess action. In Kelly the Court stated "that the Sherman Act's
express remedies could not be added to judicially by including the avoidance of private
contracts as a sanction." Id. at 519. However, it should be noted that Kelly differed from
the Mariniello case in two vital aspects. First, Kelly was concerned with a commercial
contract while Mariniello involved a special contractual relationship, the franchise relationship. Secondly, in Kelly the defendant was seeking to avoid all contractual responsibility
due to plaintiff's alleged antitrust violations, while Marinielo only proposed the reformation of the cancellation clause of his contract.
58 120 N.J. Super. at 387, 294 A.2d at 269.
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Since such a tie-in violated both state and federal law, 59 and Judge Gelman found that Marinello's eviction was the result of his failure to buy
an adequate amount of TBA from Shell, 60 the clean hands doctrine was

an appropriate defense even under Helfenbein.
The need for a franchise act in New Jersey is manifested by the
uneven results reached in the two cases involving the brothers and
Shell Oil. The Franchise Practices Act will supplement the equitable
remedies applied by courts against unfair cancellation in such random
fashion. However, franchise legislation has recently come under constitutional attack. There is authority" suggesting that such legislation
contravenes the contract clause of the United States Constitution, based
primarily on Globe Liqor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co. 6 2 In Globe
Liquor the Delaware Supreme Court struck down the Delaware Franchise Security Law, 63 holding that the statutory damages were excessively punitive 64 and that the Act was an unconstitutional violation of
the contract clause. However, the court concluded that such a federal
constitutional deficiency resulted from the fact that the legislation al-

tered previously existing contractual obligations due to its retroactive
65

effect.
New Jersey's legislation will not be subjected to the same attack
because, although it severely limits contractual freedom in the fran59 See note 45 supra.
120 N.J. Super. at 388, 294 A.2d at 269.
61 See Comment, Franchise Regulation: An Appraisal of Recent State Legislation, 13
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 529, 558-64 (1972).
62 - Del. -, 281 A.2d 19, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
63 DL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2551 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1970). This was the first state
statute to deal with general franchise terminations, affording protection to franchised
distributors and preventing unjust cancellation by franchisors. Comment, supra note 61,
at 558.
64 - Del. at -, 281 A.2d at 24. The court set forth the damages proscribed in the Act:
1. The value of the franchised distributor's tangible assets attributable to
the franchise;
2. Loss of good will;
3. Loss of profits, presumed to be not less than five times the profit in the
most recently completed fiscal year;
4. All other damages allowed by law; and
5. Counsel fees and expenses.
Id. at -, 281 A.2d at 20.
65 Id. at -, 281 A.2d at 21. The court stated:
We think the Delaware Franchise Security Law ... makes a substantive change
in the rights and obligations under this contract. These substantive changes are
the imposition on Four Roses of the obligation to deal with Globe indefinitely,
and the imposition of a penalty in the form of damages if it attempts to insist on
its contractual rights. It is therefore not a minor change or infringement permissible under the exercise of the police power. it is therefore proscribed by the
Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
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chising field, the Franchise Practices Act has no excessive punitive
damage clause6 nor does it affect existing contract rights due to its prospective application. 67 The United States Supreme Court in W. B.
Worthen Co. v. Thomas68 held that the contract clause was not absolute. It must yield to the rights of the state to legislate to protect the
vital interests of its citizens, even if so doing results in an incidental retroactive alteration of the rights of contracting individuals. 69 However,
when the legislation is prospective and thus the contract clause is inapplicable, states have considerably greater constitutional latitude,
particularly in the area of economic regulation.70 Most state franchise legislation protecting a particular industry has withstood constitutional attack on the basis that the state was employing a legitimate
use of its police power, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be
benefited were confined to one class of citizens.71 Likewise, federal
franchise legislation has been held not to violate the fifth amendment
as being vague, arbitrary, discriminatory or an unlawful taking of
72
property.
However, while the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act will
probably be upheld constitutionally, its practical effect will depend on
judicial application. The Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act,73 like
the Franchise Practices Act, was passed to establish a balance of power
between manufacturers and dealers and thus to avoid unfair cancellation of dealerships. Yet the intent of the legislation has been circumvented and automobile dealers have met with limited success in invoking
its protection.7 4 This has resulted from a judicially imposed narrow
§ 56:10-10 (Supp. 1972-73), provides:
Any franchisee may bring an action against its franchisor for violation of
this act . . . to recover damages sustained by reason of any violation of this act
and, where appropriate, shall be entitled to injunctive relief. Such franchisee, if
successful, shall also be entitled to the costs of the action including but not
limited to reasonable attorney's fees.
67 See note 10 supra.
68 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
69 Id. at 432-33.
70 See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 34; Rodes, Due Process and Social Legislation in the
Supreme Court-A Post Mortem, 33 NoTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1957).
71 See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1173, 1192-98 (1966).
72 See Blenke Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670, 672-73 (N.D. Ind. 1962),
which upheld the constitutionality of the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1221 et seq. (1970). Constitutional attacks against federal franchise legislation must be
based on the fifth amendment, because the contract clause has been held to apply only to
state legislation. See John McShain, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 205 F.2d 882, 883-84
(D.C. Cir. 1953).
73 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq. (1970).
74 See Freed, A Study of Dealers' Suits under the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act,
41 U. DE . L.J. 245, 259-61 (1964).
66 N.J. STAT. ANN.
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construction applied to the Act due to the fact that it was a limitation
upon basic contract rights. 75 In addition,
absent clear evidence of unreasonableness, the courts have been
unwilling to find a manufacturer liable for a termination or nonrenewal based upon putative "business reasons." By subtly transferring the focus of attention from its alleged abuses to the inadequahave been able to
cies of the cancelled dealership, manufacturers
successfully defend against dealer's suits.7 6
Thus the success of the Franchise Practices Act will depend to a great
extent on its reception by the judiciary. The courts must be willing
to liberally construe and apply the Act, as well as respond to attempts
77
by franchisors to defeat the purpose of the legislation.
In Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello Judge Gelman demonstrated a liberal
approach to the Act by looking at the spirit of the legislation even
though it was not officially applicable. He further preserved the proper
implementation of legislative intent by using witness credibility to
subdue the threat posed by the franchisor's "building book" on the
franchisee.78 The Franchise Practices Act does not provide guidance
regarding the evidential value of the corporate files which could be
subtly manipulated to show good cause for termination where none
actually exists. The court recognized an inherent bias in the Shell
representatives' grading reports by looking behind the mere corporate
records. 79 Reflecting a distrust of the subjective test of an individual's
ratings to determine good cause or substantial performance, the court
instead applied an objective test which considered the respective performance of other franchisees.80 This method will be effective in com75 Id. at 260.
76 Id.

77 Judge Gelman commented upon his role in effecting legislative intent:
The fact that the Legislature has acted to provide a remedy . . . does not mean
that the judicial branch is limited to the boundary lines of the legislative expression in fashioning or denying remedies in a particular case. Legislation of necessity
concerns itself with regulations of a general nature which look to the future; it
cannot deal with the specific case of Shell Oil Co. v. Frank Marinello. The latter
is peculiarly the function of the courts: to examine the facts and circumstances
of the particular case and accomplish justice and fair play as between the parties
who are before the court.
120 N.J. Super. at 375, 294 A.2d at 263.
78 Id. at 381-82, 294 A.2d at 266-67. This evidentiary problem was noted in Horton,
Legal Remedies of a Distributor Terminated Pursuant to a Contractual Provision of
Termination upon Notice, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 88, 95 (1970). The author observed that
"[t]he large manufacturer will generally have a well-documented file to show the legitimate
business reasons that led to ...termination," and suggested that a court, when judging the
value of such evidence, insure that the identical standard was applied to other distributors
of that manufacturer. Id. This was basically the approach adopted by Judge Gelman.
79 120 N.J. Super. at 380-85, 294 A.2d at 265-68.
80 Id.
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batting the possible use of "book building" by a franchisor to thwart
the intent of the legislation.8 1
Judge Gelman has laid important groundwork for the vital future
role to be played by the judiciary in balancing the power between
parties of a franchise relationship by his compilation of various equitable remedies guided by the spirit of the Franchise Practices Act.
2
With the ever-expanding popularity of the franchise arrangement,
protection must be afforded the franchisee who invests substantial time
and effort from unfair conduct by the dominant franchisor. This legislation serves to supplement these traditional equitable remedies by
presenting a clear expression of legislative policy to insure uniform
treatment of parties to a franchise agreement.
Thomas J. Spies
81 It is especially important to take an objective approach to a franchisee's performance because "[t]he usual requirements of the franchise contract are impossible to
attain, so that it may well be said that franchisees are always in default." Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEXAs L REv. 650, 662 (1971) (footnote omitted).
82 See Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS I.J. 1347, 1347-48
(1970).

